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The Political Economy of Aid for 
Power Sector Reform
Neil McCulloch, Esméralda Sindou and John Ward1
Abstract Recent literature on the effectiveness of donor programmes 
points to the importance of understanding the political context within 
which reforms are taking place. The characteristics of the power sector 
make reform intensely political in almost all countries and donor projects 
have sometimes failed because of an inability to navigate the local politics 
of reform. This article reviews what is known about how donors have taken 
politics into account in designing and implementing power sector reform 
programmes in sub-Saharan Africa. It illustrates the challenges which 
donors have faced with reference to a case study of donor attempts to 
support power sector reform in Tanzania. The article draws on documentary 
evidence from major donors as well as a set of qualitative interviews with 
experienced project supervisors to provide a set of lessons for donors about 
how to incorporate political context into the design and implementation of 
power sector projects.
Keywords: political economy, aid, power sector reform, electricity, 
Tanzania, donors.
1 Introduction
There has been a resurgence of  interest in recent years, amongst both 
practitioners and the academic community, in the political economy 
of  donor engagement in reform processes (Carothers and de Gramont 
2013). A series of  studies has suggested that projects that take a flexible 
and adaptive approach to reform have been more successful. For 
example, Andrews, Pritchett and Woolcock (2012) and Andrews (2014) 
have argued that programmes should focus on problem-solving through 
an iterative process; whilst Pritchett, Samji and Hammer (2013) have 
argued that projects should ‘crawl the design space’ for solutions. 
Similarly, Booth (2015) argues for the need to ‘think and work politically’, 
whilst Levy (2014) provides a theoretical framework for how reform can 
‘work with the grain’ of  the domestic political reality. There is also a 
growing literature of  comparative case studies (e.g. Booth and Unsworth 
2014) that argues that aid programmes which are flexible, long-term 
and locally owned are likely to be much more effective in achieving 
sustainable change than more traditional ‘linear’ programmes.
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Donors have been paying attention to this literature and are increasingly 
recognising that an appreciation of  the politics of  the sectors and 
countries in which they are operating is essential for successful and 
sustainable reform. One of  the consequences of  this work has been 
considerably greater interest and uptake by donors in ‘political economy 
analysis’ (PEA) (Fritz, Levy and Ort 2014). Many donors now routinely 
conduct a PEA as part of  the preparation of  a project and some embed 
regular sectoral or issue-based PEAs into the operation of  projects. 
Some have gone even further – for example, the Department for 
International Development (DFID) has sent several hundred of  its staff 
on a training course about politics and institutions in order to try to 
change the mindset of  technical staff about the importance of  political 
considerations in projects. What is less clear is the extent to which such 
analysis is translating into different designs and different approaches to 
the implementation of  projects. A recent review of  DFID experience 
suggested that, whilst PEAs have been mainstreamed in many areas, this 
has resulted in relatively little change in the types of  projects that are 
actually implemented (Piron et al. 2016). 
This article examines how donors have tried to take political context 
into account in their support of  reform efforts in one particular area 
and region – power sector reform in sub-Saharan Africa. In most 
countries, power systems are centralised, mainly based on a national 
grid, and although electricity is part of  the development narrative of  
most countries, it tends to be controlled by a domestic elite, and is a 
significant source of  rents. Thus, although there is politics associated 
with reform in all sectors, the characteristics of  the power sector make 
accounting for political considerations particularly important. 
There is already a literature on the political economy of  power sector 
reform. Numerous papers have looked at the politics of  reform 
(see Gratwick and Eberhard (2008) and Eberhard et al. (2016) for 
descriptions of  reform in sub-Saharan Africa; Dubash and Rajan (2001) 
and Tongia (2006) describe the political economy of  reform in India; 
Victor and Heller (2006) describe the politics of  reform in five major 
developing economies; Scott and Seth (2013) provide a literature 
review of  reform of  electricity distribution in developing countries; 
Kojima, Bacon and Trimble (2014) review the literature on reform of  
power sector subsidies). However, this literature focuses on the political 
economy of  the reform process within individual countries, where the 
main actors are government, business, and voters.
By contrast, rather little has been written about the role of  donors 
and the extent to which they have taken knowledge about the politics 
of  reform into account in the design and implementation of  their 
programmes in Africa. Our research questions are: to what extent have 
donors analysed the underlying political constraints that they face? 
Have donors significantly shifted the nature of  the power sector reform 
programmes which they implement as a result of  a better understanding 
of  the political context? Are they taking on board the lessons from 
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recent research on ‘thinking and working politically’ and, if  so, how? 
Are there general lessons that can be learned about what sorts of  
approaches to power sector reform are more, or less, successful and how 
this varies by context? 
This article reviews the existing studies – both published and, where 
available, donor evaluations – looking at how donors have navigated 
the political economy of  power sector reform. It complements this by 
collecting documentation on power sector reform projects implemented 
by the major donors in Tanzania over the last decade or so. This is 
supplemented with qualitative analysis based on a set of  interviews 
with experienced donor officials responsible for the implementation 
of  power sector reform projects. We conclude with a summary of  the 
lessons, from the literature and our case study, about how donors might 
respond more effectively to the political challenges associated with 
power sector reform.
2 Methodology
Our methodology has three components.
First, we examine the literature about the political economy of  aid 
in the power sector (including reviews conducted by donors such as 
Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu Emerging Markets (2004); Besant-Jones 
(2006); and Deloitte (2015)). We limit the scope of  this review to 
studies that have examined the role of  donors in power sector reform 
in developing countries and how they have designed and implemented 
such programmes in the prevailing political context in the countries of  
operation. Thus, we do not review all studies on the political economy 
of  power sector reform, but focus on synthesising available literature on 
how this has influenced donor programming in sub-Saharan Africa in 
particular. 
Second, we have attempted to obtain information and documentation 
about the power sector reform projects supported by donors over the 
last decade (or longer where appropriate) in Tanzania. Tanzania was 
chosen because of  the length and intensity of  donor engagement in 
power sector reform, providing a literature and experience to draw on. 
The documentation for these projects was then used to answer a set 
of  questions including: how political considerations were taken into 
account in the design of  the project; how challenges and blockages 
were handled during the course of  implementation; what the overall 
performance of  the project was; and what lessons were learned in terms 
of  project design and implementation.
Third, we conducted a series of  qualitative interviews with experienced 
project supervisors from the major donors who were supporting power 
sector reform for Tanzania. This was in order to obtain their views 
about the critical success factors for power sector reform projects and, 
specifically, how projects have attempted to take into account the politics 
of  sector reform.2
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3 A brief history of donor engagement in power sector reform
Although donors have been involved in supporting power sector 
investments since the 1950s, the nature of  development partner 
involvement in power sector reform in developing countries is rooted 
in the transformations that affected the sector in Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries in the 
1980s. During that time, a combination of  political, financial, and 
technical factors triggered power sector reforms in the UK, Chile, and 
Norway (Gratwick and Eberhard 2008). These countries’ experiences 
appeared to demonstrate the benefits of  such reforms, which were 
then followed by several other industrialised and some developing 
nations from the early 1990s. Since then, power sector reform has 
been advocated by the development community, including the World 
Bank, the Inter-American Development Bank, the European Bank 
of  Reconstruction and Development, as well as other international 
agencies, such as the World Energy Council (Bacon and Besant-Jones 
2002). Thus, donors have played a major role as the architects of  
reforms in the power sector, and have often attempted to initiate reform 
through the provision of  technical assistance and capacity-building 
programmes in developing countries (Wamukonya 2003; Dornan 2014). 
At first, most development partners typically implemented a somewhat 
uniform approach to power sector reform. The approach taken in 
OECD countries crystallised into a ‘standard’ or ‘textbook’ approach 
to restructuring the sector, which aimed at fully unbundling and 
liberalising the power sector following a logical sequence of  distinct 
steps: corporatisation, commercialisation, legislation, regulation, 
restructuring, privatisation, and competition (Gratwick and Eberhard 
2008; Joskow 2006; Littlechild 2006; Hunt 2002). 
The development community promoted power sector reform out of  
a belief  that the standard ‘model’ would enable the transformation of  
poorly performing energy systems in developing countries, promoting 
growth and improving access for poor populations. It was felt that the 
recommended structure and regulation of  the sector would benefit 
consumers by allowing their participation in the market and by ensuring 
consumer protection (United States Government Accountability Office 
2005). In the words of  one former senior donor official from a major 
multilateral donor, ‘there was, in the early 1990s, a strong belief  that 
one size did actually fit all.’
However, the application of  the ‘standard model’ of  reform in 
developing countries yielded rather modest results, as it faced significant 
political barriers (Besant-Jones 2006; Choynowski 2004). The consensus 
in the literature is that the standard model failed for three main reasons. 
First, it often failed to take account of  the vastly different circumstances 
prevailing in developing countries from those in the OECD countries 
where it was first implemented. For example, the textbook model 
for power sector reform did not make sense in many small African 
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countries, where the necessary degree of  competition in the generation 
segment cannot be obtained due to the small size of  the power system 
and insufficient generation capacity (Barnett 2014). 
Second, the model struggled to map out a feasible pathway for reform. 
As Victor and Heller summarise, ‘[T]he standard textbook for reform 
focuses on the end point, namely an unbundled, privately owned and 
competitive power sector, not on the steps that governments need to 
take towards that end’ (2006: 21). In practice, governments tried a wide 
variety of  approaches to reach the end point, not all of  which were 
successful (Chikuni et al. 2011).
Third, and perhaps most important, many reform attempts failed to 
understand or, at least, to take account of, the underlying political 
constraints facing decision-makers. In almost all countries, reform of  
the power sector is an extremely sensitive area. Electricity is part of  
the development vision of  all countries and therefore brings significant 
political benefits to leaders who can control the price of  and access to a 
key developmental service. Economies of  scale mean that large financial 
flows are involved in procuring power production, transmission, 
and distribution systems. The centralised nature of  the technology 
concentrates control in the hands of  relatively few powerful individuals.3 
As a result, the location of  transmission and distribution lines can be 
driven by electoral considerations, power may be rationed to influence 
voters, and power generation may fluctuate with the election cycle 
(Tripp 2012; de Mesquita and Smith 2009). Utilities have historically 
been used to serve the broader patronage system and became large 
employers (Barnett 2014). As reforms often emphasise restructuring 
utilities, they have faced strong resistance from labour unions (Eberhard 
2004; Dubash and Rajan 2001). Reforms also encouraged cost-reflective 
pricing, but the associated price increases have resulted in popular 
uprisings in several countries including Argentina, India, Indonesia, 
Ghana, and South Africa (Dubash and Rajan 2001).4 
Thus, rather than the ‘standard model’, the reforms of  the last two decades 
have generated a wide variety of  ‘hybrid’ structures (see Eberhard et al. 
(2016); Trimble et al. (2016) for a recent classification of  different systems 
in Africa). In each case, these reflect the outcome of  a complex and 
context-specific contestation both between domestic actors (utilities, 
independent power producers, regulators, finance ministries, energy 
ministries, and political leaders) and between domestic and international 
actors (independent power producers, donors, and other financiers).
Donors responded to the challenges of  implementation in different 
ways. Some development partners had considerably more leverage than 
others due to the scale of  the resources which they were providing. The 
literature points to examples, predominantly from the 1990s, where 
countries were effectively forced to implement the reforms suggested 
by donors because of  the conditions included in loan packages 
(Wamukonya 2003; Lefevre and Todoc 2000).
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There is also evidence that pressure to implement the recommended 
reforms was strengthened by coordination amongst donors. The 
World Bank, for example, refused to fund more capital investments 
until specific reforms had been implemented and most other donors 
would only support programmes that the Bank had approved 
(Barnett 2014). 
Some donors also responded by attempting to insulate reforms from 
politics. For example, Bouille, Dubrovsky and Maurer (2002) describe 
how in Argentina, a small group of  politically powerful bureaucrats, 
supported by multilateral agencies, designed the reforms without 
engaging with other relevant public agencies or civil society. However, 
this opaque process created political opposition and resulted in a lack of  
ownership of  the reforms by key stakeholders. 
By the early 2000s, the donor community was conscious of  the difficulties 
being encountered in the implementation of  power sector reform in 
developing countries. The World Bank commissioned a major review 
of  its power sector operations which has been extremely influential in 
shaping the approach taken by most development partners over the last 
decade (Besant-Jones 2006). It concluded that ‘the most important lesson 
from reforming power markets in developing countries is that “cookbook” 
solutions for reforming their power markets are ruled out by the extensive 
range of  economic and institutional endowments of  these countries’ 
(ibid.: 1).
The consequence of  this reappraisal was the abandonment of  the 
‘one-size-fits-all’ approach. The World Bank issued new Operational 
Guidance to its staff (World Bank 2004), which emphasised context 
specificity and the importance of  the political dimensions of  reform. 
In particular, a stronger focus was put on identifying ‘stakeholders with 
the incentive and influence to press for improved performance’ and 
‘top-level political decision makers’, who will be able to champion the 
reform process (Fritz et al. 2014: 134; Levy 2007).
The last decade has therefore seen a considerable amount of  
experimentation by development partners and closer attention to 
understanding the political context. But donors still face considerable 
challenges in navigating the complex politics of  power sector reform 
and it is not clear whether the deeper understanding of  context has 
yet translated into donors undertaking different interventions in the 
countries that they support. Thompson and Bazilian (2014) assert that 
donor-funded technical assistance and capacity-building activities still 
avoid ‘the fundamental political issue of  who wields political power and 
how that power is wielded’. And Naqvi (2016), in examining the role of  
development actors in power sector reform in Pakistan, highlights how 
awareness of  the complex political problems associated with reform 
is not sufficient to avoid them, pointing to a higher order of  structural 
obstacles within development partners that remain unaddressed.
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To understand these obstacles further and assess how donors have 
addressed them, the next section examines reforms in Tanzania and the 
role of  development partners in the process.
4 Power sector reform in Tanzania
4.1 The Tanzanian reform experience
The Tanzanian power sector is dominated by a state-owned and 
vertically integrated utility, the Tanzania Electricity Supply Company 
(TANESCO), which has been struggling financially for many years. Its 
precarious financial situation has led to chronic underinvestment in the 
sector, from both public and private investors, which in turn resulted in 
significant underperformance for decades, both in terms of  quality of  
supply and coverage. The lack of  reliable electricity supply has been 
identified as one of  the three major constraints to growth in the country 
(Partnership for Growth 2011). 
Reforms began in the 1990s, when the country’s structural adjustment 
programme supported by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
and the World Bank, was expanded to the power sector through the 
inclusion of  sector-specific conditions in general budget support. 
Restructuring and privatisation were deemed the solution to 
TANESCO’s financial deficits and the generation segment was opened 
to independent power producers (Ghanadan and Eberhard 2007). 
In the mid-1990s, reflecting the expectations that the private sector 
would fill the investment gap in the generation segment, donors mostly 
withdrew their direct support to the development of  power projects. 
Unfortunately, the relatively rapid reduction in donor funding for power 
supply and technical investments worsened the investment gap in the 
sector, as private capital failed to pick up. 
Despite the changes associated with the reforms, neither TANESCO’s 
financial situation nor the quality of  supply improved. This led to the 
management of  TANESCO being outsourced to a private company 
from 2002 until the end of  2006. The management contract placed an 
overwhelming emphasis on increasing the utility’s short-term revenues, 
which may have deterred long-term investments. The results of  this 
were also unconvincing – whilst commercial performance improved, 
there was little improvement in service quality or transmission and 
distribution losses. In 2005, the newly elected government terminated 
the management contract at the end of  2006 and de-specified 
TANESCO for privatisation. 
Consequently, between 1997 and 2006, the utility suffered from a critical 
lack of  investments, in its workforce, systems, and infrastructure, reflecting 
the view that long-term investments would not benefit the government or 
the managing entity, as TANESCO was expected to be privatised. The 
‘generation gap’ left in TANESCO by the lack of  recruitment in the last 
decade is still a major concern for the utility. The utility also requires a 
technological turnaround and related capacity building, as its systems 
have not kept speed with the revolution in industry-specific technologies.
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Notwithstanding the difficulties in reforming TANESCO, the 2000s 
saw significant changes in the legal, regulatory, and institutional 
environment. The Energy and Water Utilities Regulatory Authority 
(EWURA) Act was passed in 2001 (although it only came into being 
in 2006). On paper, the institutional structure and governance of  the 
sector is excellent, as the legislation guarantees the autonomy of  the 
regulator and the participation of  the public. However, in practice, 
the Ministry of  Energy and Minerals can exercise political pressure 
and intervenes on regulatory issues, in particular, tariff setting. Other 
changes included the creation of  a Rural Electrification Agency in 2005, 
to focus on extending access. And in 2008 an Electricity Act was passed 
that encourages private participation in the sector. 
Whilst these legislative and institutional changes might signal a 
renewed commitment for creating a conducive environment for 
private investments (Kapika and Eberhard 2013), the deals struck 
with private investors have not always been transparent, which has 
heightened suspicion about private sector investments. For example, the 
lack of  planning in the sector, combined with severe droughts, forced 
TANESCO to resort to emergency power producers in 2006 and 2011. 
The absence of  competitive and transparent tendering resulted in one of  
the largest scandals in the country’s history (Kapika and Eberhard 2013) 
and put TANESCO on the verge of  bankruptcy, as the negotiated cost 
of  electricity with emergency power producers significantly exceeded 
the tariff. This experience demonstrates that strong negotiation skills 
and an in-depth knowledge of  competitive procurement in the utility are 
paramount to enable private sector participation in the long term.
In 2013, the Government of  Tanzania, through ‘Big Results Now’, 
a programme aimed at fast-tracking projects of  national importance 
in key sectors of  the economy, including energy, promised a reform 
of  the sector (Government of  Tanzania 2013) including unbundling, 
commercialisation, and sale. This has been followed by a new Roadmap 
which was approved by the Cabinet in 2015. However, the latter was 
funded by the African Development Bank and was undertaken by a 
Western consultancy company. Its recommendations bear a strong 
resemblance to the ‘standard model’, promising to unbundle and 
liberalise the power sector by 2025. The election of  President Magufuli 
in 2015 led to the dismantling of  the Big Results Now programme. In 
January 2017, the managing director of  TANESCO was removed and 
a tariff increase was reversed; more recently, the director-general of  the 
regulator was suspended. Both moves point to the continued influence 
of  political considerations in the management of  the power sector. 
4.2 The role of donors 
Traditionally, the dominant approach to influencing power sector 
reform in Tanzania has been through general budget support. 
Combined commitments from donors were substantial and represented 
a potentially influential tool, since some donors have made the 
disbursement of  their loans conditional on the adoption of  reforms. 
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Since the Busan Partnership agreement on development cooperation in 
December 2011, ‘a lot of  donors were going for low-hanging fruits’ to 
yield measurable ‘results’ quickly, ‘instead of  thinking of  the long term,’ 
according to one interviewee.5 Also, despite some willingness amongst 
donors to develop a common Performance Assessment Framework to 
measure the effectiveness of  aid, there has been a lack of  alignment 
between the framework and the conditions of  disbursement of  further 
loans. This was due to both the complexity of  the results framework and 
competing donor interests and approaches. 
Coordination is also made more difficult by the large number of  
development partners working in Tanzania; and this is reinforced by the 
limited ability of  the Tanzanian government to coordinate them. In an 
attempt to address this, donors have formed the Energy Development 
Partners’ Group, intended as a sector-wide platform for dialogue 
with government. However, as each country’s presence in Tanzania is 
founded on bilateral diplomatic relationships, the government has no 
incentive to deal with development partners as a united block of  donors. 
Commercial interests have not been absent from the considerations of  
bilateral donors when promoting reforms. In the words of  one senior 
donor official6 from a major bilateral donor, the ‘dialogue with the 
main sector stakeholders started very good, and development partners 
managed to affect them in many many areas, until a number of  
development partners wanted to promote their interests more than that 
of  the Tanzanians. Then the relationship became difficult.’ This has 
undermined trust between the government and donors, since it is not 
always clear to the government that the approach being promoted is in 
the long-term interest of  Tanzania. 
Furthermore, some development partners have a particular ideological 
position about unbundling and liberalisation, despite the limited 
number of  actors in the sector, which makes it difficult to achieve 
enough competition in the market, and the lack of  high-level expertise 
necessary to manage the independent system operator required. In 
other cases, the relatively rapid rotation of  staff in donor agencies can 
mean that there is an insufficient understanding of  the country’s politics 
combined with a lack of  skill in supervising and monitoring reform 
recommendations produced by independent consultants to ensure that 
they are consistent with the local context. This might also be amplified 
by the fact that consultants are often contracted by donors, with limited 
inputs from the government, and, in turn, frequently recycle the 
standard model with relatively little modification for country context.
The experience of  donor engagements in Tanzania exemplifies some of  
the key challenges faced by external actors in promoting power sector 
reform. Frequent changes in government policy and attitude towards 
reform, combined with a mistrust of  the motives of  foreign partners 
and an historical antipathy towards the private sector make it hard for 
development partners to support a reform process. For their part, a lack 
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of  serious analysis of  the underlying political constraints, combined with 
rapid turnover of  donor officials, has resulted in a reliance on a standard 
model of  reform with seemingly little attempt to tailor this to Tanzania’s 
context. The result has been de jure reforms which satisfy the donors and 
release funding, but little de facto reform in the way in which the sector 
operates. However, the efforts of  specific individuals to build trusting 
relationships with key government counterparts and tailor interventions 
accordingly have yielded important practical reforms in some areas.
5 Lessons learned
Our analysis of  the academic literature and documentation from donor 
projects, along with our interviews with donor officials suggest some 
general lessons for policymakers, both in development partners and 
developing country governments.
5.1 Analysing the underlying politics of change in a country is valuable – 
but only if used 
One of  the surprising findings that emerged from our interviews was 
the absence of  any significant formal analysis of  the political context, 
in which reforms were being undertaken. Reforms were viewed as 
technical with the result that the only analysis undertaken prior to the 
implementation of  projects were assessments of  the different technical 
aspects of  the project, rather than assessment of  the wider political 
context and the incentives facing the various stakeholders.7 Even where 
assessments are done, there seems to be little connection between 
the theoretical assessments provided by political economy analysis 
and operational programmes implemented on the ground (Levy and 
Palale (2014) provide an exception for Zambia). There is also a tension 
between those that believe that developing a deep understanding of  the 
local political context is essential to success and others who believe that 
remaining politically ‘neutral’ requires focusing only on technical aspects.
Notwithstanding this, almost all donor officials interviewed displayed a 
detailed understanding of  the political context in which they operated, 
with many arguing that success depended far more on intensive 
engagement with counterparts in government than any formal analysis 
of  the context. As one respondent put it, ‘[H]aving key staff and 
development partners work intensively and over a long period of  time 
[with the government] is important.’8 However, the instruments at 
their disposal, the pressure to disburse, and the processes with which 
they had to comply seemed to, at best, discourage taking a slower and 
more reflective approach to engagement. For all donors, it appears 
to be difficult to not pursue reform, even if  there is evidence that the 
particular pathway being proposed is unlikely to be successful.
Indeed, most projects provide an optimistic view about what will be 
achieved and only mention political interference as a potential risk to 
implementation. This is despite the fact most donor officials accepted 
that political interference in the power sector was a near certainty, 
and that many previous projects had cost two or three times as much 
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as originally anticipated and taken two or three times longer than 
originally planned. It is not entirely clear why development partners are 
driven to pursue reforms; this may relate to the ‘mental model’ adopted 
by the donor (see Section 5.4), or to the belief  that funds are only likely 
to be effective if  reforms take place. However, it would appear that the 
internal approval processes for such projects may sometimes discourage 
honesty about the practical political challenges that they entail.
There would also appear to be a reluctance to apply such analysis ex post 
as well. With the exception of  the World Bank, no other development 
partner had readily available project completion reports for power sector 
projects (including those supporting policy reforms) and virtually no 
donors appear to have assessed in a systematic fashion the political factors 
that determined success or failure. There would appear to be a strong 
case for more systematic ex post evaluation of  power sector projects.
5.2 Flexibility is important – but there are reasons why it is difficult
Much of  the recent mantra about project design is that donor 
programmes (in all sectors) should be flexible and adaptive (Andrews et al. 
2012). Indeed, some of  the successes reflect the ability for development 
partners to act in a flexible and opportunistic way. Flexibility also allows 
donors to shift focus to take account of  changes in government and key 
personnel in counterparts, as well as enabling implementing partners to 
experiment with alternative approaches to solving problems.9
However, respondents also pointed to significant structural and 
procedural reasons as to why flexibility is difficult. For example, 
USAID receives funding from Congress that is allocated by sector 
and by country, inhibiting the flexibility to shift resources from less 
effective to more effective areas. Internal structures can also matter – 
complex reforms often require multidisciplinary approaches, but donor 
staff are often arranged by sector and discipline, making building a 
multidisciplinary team difficult. Different types of  donors can also 
work with different counterparts. Bilateral donors generally have the 
capability to work with a range of  counterparts in developing countries, 
including sometimes, the private sector and civil society and to work 
through contractors. Multilateral organisations, by contrast, are 
typically constrained to work through government which can restrict 
the nature of  programmes that they can operate. This is a particular 
problem in the power sector, where projects often must work through 
the Ministry of  Energy, even where political influence by the ministry is 
a key constraint in progressing reform.
Flexibility is particularly difficult when it comes to stopping ongoing 
initiatives. Once approved, the obligation on donor officials and 
implementers is to make a success of  a project. This provides strong 
incentives to continue activities, even when external, often politically 
induced, changes have made the chances of  success slim. Conversely, 
officials have greater flexibility to add components to programmes, with 
the result that programmes evolve by growth rather than by re-allocation.
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Flexible programmes are also perceived to be more difficult to evaluate. 
Building a good relationship may be key to achieving reform, but is 
hard to assess in a results matrix. Flexible programmes typically consist 
of  multiple initiatives which are not known in advance, making it much 
harder to design a monitoring and evaluation framework for such 
programmes.10 
Donor programmes are evolving to address some of  the challenges 
created by flexible programming, but difficulties remain. For example, 
some of  the recent programmes designed by DFID in other sectors 
have deliberately built-in flexibility to allow a response to changing 
and emerging needs of  the host country government. This may be 
easier in larger programmes, especially those backed by a long-standing 
relationship between donors and host country governments. At the 
same time, the monitoring and evaluation can be facilitated by retaining 
a clear sense of  the overall outcomes that the donor programme is 
seeking to effect. But the stakeholders interviewed for this case study 
suggested that, despite some progress towards more flexible programme 
design, the structural and procedural constraints outlined previously 
remain a significant barrier to more flexible and politically informed 
ways of  working.
5.3 Dialogue, trust, and personal relationships are of critical importance 
for reform
Perhaps the most consistent message from our interviews related to 
the critical importance of  dialogue, trust, and personal relationships 
with key decision-makers. Again, this is true for all sectors, not just 
the power sector11 – but the long-term nature and sunk costs of  power 
sector reforms make the issue of  particular salience. Respondents 
often attributed programme failures to a lack of  trust between the 
government and donors. Almost every instance of  successful reform was 
related to the construction of  an effective working relationship through 
intensive and repeated interaction, often over a long period of  time. 
A number of  respondents pointed to the need to understand the nature 
of  the constraints facing policymakers and the need to ‘listen more and 
lecture less’. One respondent argued that loan conditionality was only 
effective when the conditions were suggested by the government as a 
mechanism to help them to handle domestic resistance. Overall, there 
was a consensus that ‘there is no substitute for an experienced and 
credible [donor] staff member who has the trust and confidence of  the 
key decision-maker.’12
Notwithstanding the almost universal support for the importance of  
building trust, there was a sense from some respondents that donor 
structures and training are making this more difficult than before. Some 
officials highlighted the burden of  process compliance taking time that 
might otherwise be spent engaging key stakeholders. Some related the 
bureaucratic burden to risk aversion associated with (donor country) 
domestic political concerns; others pointed to the results agenda as a 
source of  additional administrative work to ‘prove’ that aid is working. 
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A number of  respondents suggested that the frequent rotation of  
donor staff undermines the ability to build long-term relationships with 
key government counterparts and noted the difficulty of  maintaining 
institutional memory as well as a good understanding of  the country’s 
recent history. For example, one official suggested that the reticence of  
Tanzanian officials to pursue certain types of  reform was rooted in the 
experience of  reform attempts in the early 1990s; failing to understand 
this might result in pursuing reform models which, although technically 
sound, were politically unfeasible.
5.4 Mental models matter
As noted in the literature review, the application of  the standard model 
for power sector reform has not generally been successful in developing 
countries. Notwithstanding the growing body of  evidence supporting this, 
the core elements of  the standard model – unbundling, commercialisation, 
privatisation, competition – still appear to hold sway in the thinking, both 
of  development partners and some government officials. However, some 
senior donor officials argue that this view is mistaken, firstly because the 
standard model was rarely actually implemented in practice and so cannot 
be deemed to have failed; and secondly, because adherence to the model 
was abandoned in the early 2000s, notably by the World Bank, as evidence 
of  its unsuitability came to light.
Although both of  these are true, our research leads us to believe that 
the ‘standard model’ still holds considerable sway as a ‘mental model’. 
The standard model is clear, coherent and logical. It was generally 
regarded as a success in England and Wales, Chile and Norway. Despite 
accepting the need for context specificity, development partners have 
struggled to adjust because there is no other compelling ‘mental model’ 
to which to refer. Rather, a set of  path-dependent ‘hybrid’ models 
has begun to develop (Gratwick and Eberhard 2008) based on local 
experimentation within different political contexts. However, most 
international consultants, on whom donor officials depend, are still 
most familiar with the standard model. As a result, it has been difficult 
for donors to shift their advice, whilst developing countries have found 
it hard to gain donor acceptance of  the somewhat expedient and 
path-dependent approaches that have been implemented in practice.
5.5 There may be an opportunity to build domestic demand for reform
One of  the surprising findings from the project documentation and 
interviews was that development partners have put relatively little effort 
into building a wider domestic constituency for reform in the countries 
in which they operate. In general, donors appear to have interpreted 
the ‘country ownership’ principle of  the Busan Partnership for Effective 
Development to mean government ownership. None of  the projects 
reviewed in Tanzania included activities to build support for reform 
outside of  government.
There are several reasons for this. First, in some countries donor projects 
are tightly controlled by the government, which may be unsympathetic 
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towards activities that attempt to support advocacy activities. Moreover, 
many donors, particularly the multilateral development banks, typically 
work directly with government counterparts, making work with other 
stakeholders more challenging. Indeed, some respondents argued that, 
in certain countries, it was neither possible nor necessary to engage with 
wider civil society since all the key decisions were taken by a narrow 
group centred on the government.
Second, several donor officials said that engaging groups outside of  
government in favour of  support was not possible because there simply 
was not a constituency of  support for reform. For example, large 
industrial customers, who constitute the majority of  electricity demand, 
can have significant influence over policy – but their interest is primarily 
in maintaining low prices. Small businesses without electricity might be 
expected to support improvements in access, but generally do not wish to 
pay a significantly higher tariff to obtain it. And the majority of  households 
in Tanzania are poor and are not believed to support cost-reflective tariffs 
that would significantly increase the price of  access and supply.
This lack of  interest in building coalitions in support of  reform is 
nonetheless surprising, given the growing literature on the importance 
of  building broader coalitions to achieve sustainable reform (see 
Faustino and Booth 2014; Buckley, McCulloch and Travis 2017). Whilst 
no one is likely to be in favour of  price increases in the short term, 
there are constituencies that would benefit from reform in the longer 
term (e.g. businesses that obtain more reliable supply; households and 
communities that can be connected because the utility is able to invest 
in expansion; civil society groups campaigning against corruption in the 
sector, etc.). There are strong parallels with the literature on fuel subsidy 
reform, where effective communication about the issue to build a wider 
constituency of  support has been an essential part of  successful reforms 
(Beaton et al. 2013; Kojima et al. 2014).
6 Conclusion
Our central finding is that, whilst development partners are often fully 
aware of  the political nature of  reform of  the power sector, they appear 
to devote much less attention to the analysis of  these political constraints 
and that what analysis there is has little or no influence on the nature 
of  programmes that are put in place. Moreover, many development 
partners appear to be unaware of  the emerging aid modalities for 
engaging with such dynamic political contexts or, for structural or 
political reasons, are unable or unwilling to adopt them.
We suggest that, at a minimum, future programme designs should 
start with a detailed analysis of  the underlying motivations of  the key 
actors and institutions in order to identify reform pathways that are 
politically feasible, rather than just those that are technically desirable. 
In general, donor interventions in this field should be based around 
the concept of  ‘politically feasible and technically sound’ rather than 
the present approach of  proposing technically sound solutions with the 
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lack of  political feasibility treated as a risk to be mitigated. Our work 
also suggests that development partners face a difficult choice between 
two rather different principles. One the one hand, where the political 
analysis indicates that certain reforms are likely to be impossible, they 
must find ways to ‘work with the grain’ (Levy 2014), i.e. to identify 
useful activities that are consistent with the current political equilibrium 
to maximise the chances of  success. On the other hand, sometimes 
long-term sustainability requires a change in the political equilibrium. 
This suggests that development partners should consider ways in which 
they can support legitimate, credible domestic actors to challenge the 
status quo. Such interventions are common in the wider governance field, 
but rare in power sector reform.
Finally, our work poses an empirical challenge. Our theory is that 
new, more politically savvy approaches may help development partner 
interventions on power sector reform to be more successful. Insofar as 
such approaches are adopted going forward, there is a need to test this 
empirically to see whether such programmes are actually more effective 
and how their success or failure depends on the nature of  the political 
context and the way in which they are implemented.
Notes
1 We would like to thank Catherine Wolfram and Paul Gertler for 
their overall intellectual guidance of  the Energy and Economic 
Growth research programme for which the working paper preceding 
this article was originally produced, as well as Marcela Tarazona, 
Carson Cristiano and Felicity Le Quesne for their excellent 
management of  the process. John Besant-Jones, Anton Eberhard, 
Vivien Foster, Catrina Godinho, Alan Lee, Joyashree Roy and 
Jonathan Walters, as well as two anonymous reviewers, provided 
helpful comments and suggestions, and Ana Pueyo and Simon 
Bawakyillenuo gave excellent editorial guidance. We are grateful 
for financial support from UK Aid, through the Department for 
International Development (DFID). Our principal debt is to the 
senior aid officials from a range of  agencies who gave generously of  
their time to explain how donors have attempted to engage with the 
complex political economy of  power sector reform.
2 Donors interviewed include: DFID, USAID, Power Africa, 
Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC), the Swedish 
International Development Cooperation Agency (Sida), the World 
Bank and the African Development Bank.
3 There is, of  course, a live debate about how developing countries 
might ‘leapfrog’ Western centralised power systems by adopting 
technology which allows a more distributed form of  production, 
transmission, and distribution.
4 Hall, Lobina and de la Motte (2005) document civil society 
opposition to water and electricity privatisation in developing 
countries; Wood (2005) notes that fundamentally different 
understandings of  public participation amongst stakeholders have 
stunted meaningful dialogue around reform.
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5 Interview, September 2016. 
6 Interview, September 2016.
7 It is possible that donors may undertake these assessments but not 
publish them because of  their sensitivity. Whilst this may be true, our 
interviews suggest that formal assessments of  this kind are rare and 
that these issues, if  tackled at all, are typically addressed informally 
through discussions around assumptions and risks.
8 Interview, September 2016.
9 This said, flexibility is not always seen as positive – one experienced 
donor official commented that ‘flexibility in reform tactics is often 
necessary, whereas flexibility in reform strategy is seldom advisable’ 
(interview, September 2016).
10 Although not impossible – see Ladner (2015) for recent work in this 
area.
11 Indeed, one of  the challenges in building these relationships can 
be that work in the power sector may be a small component of  the 
overall work of  some donors and so resources are devoted to building 
relationships elsewhere.
12 Interview, September 2016.
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